While Canada's nuclear research has been vast and often on the leading edge, our domestic deployment of nuclear power technology has been necessarily specialized.

Historically in this sector we have been a nation of CANDU reactors. This singular Canadian technology has influenced our nuclear supply chains and our domestic fuel cycle. The CANDU reactor's ability to operate on natural uranium has meant, for example, that Canada has never needed a domestic uranium enrichment capability.

This is now changing, and it should prompt a strategic review of Canada's nuclear fuel cycle and supply chains.

The adoption of small modular reactor (SMR) technology in Ontario marks the beginning of a fundamental shift in Canadian nuclear deployment, with cascading effects that will be seen in Canada's supply chains and fuel cycle. Simply, Canada will now need enriched uranium. The question is how much and whether it will be produced domestically or imported from abroad — both scenarios starting with a raw resource produced in Canada.

In light of this, it is time for Canada to re-assess whether Canadian uranium should be enriched in Canada for peaceful uses.

This topic is often fraught with misperception and erroneous statements. It is therefore worth clarifying that Canada, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), can domestically enrich uranium for peaceful purposes without violating any international treaty obligation.

To be clear: peaceful uranium enrichment is compatible with Canada's longstanding domestic and international non-proliferation commitments.

It is commonly misunderstood that only nuclear weapon states enrich uranium, and that enrichment is synonymous with nuclear weapons. In reality a number of non-nuclear weapon states peacefully enrich uranium to support the operation of the majority of the world's commercial power reactors. This includes Germany, the Netherland and Japan.

However, current global enrichment capacity is dominated by state-owned enterprises in countries that are adversarial towards Canada. According to recent estimates, Russia supplies 44% and China 16% of enriched uranium, globally. Europe and the US produce a combined total of 40% of the world's enriched uranium.

Canadian policy has begun to respond to these market and geo-political dynamics, but much more could be done.

In 2023, Canada and four other G7 nations, known as the "Sapporo Five", announced a civil nuclear fuel cooperation agreement which resolved to "establish a resilient global uranium supply market free from Russian influence and the potential to be subject to political leverage by other countries."

In the 2024 federal Fall Economic Statement, the federal government committed to provide a $500 million backstop for the purchase of enriched uranium from allied countries.

Ontario Power Generation (OPG) has announced it is partnering with companies from Canada, the U.S., and France to ensure a fuel supply for the first of its SMRs at the Darlington New Nuclear Project.

Therefore, as Canada and many of its allies deploy nuclear technologies which rely on enriched uranium, fuel security ought to become more of an imperative. The ecosystem forsupporting the operation of these reactors is becoming just as critical as the regulatory pathways for building them on time and on budget.

In this context, domestic uranium enrichment takes on strategic national energy and security importance, with significant economic export potential.

As Canada's and the world's demand for enriched uranium grows, there is a significant opportunity for Canada to enhance its energy superpower status, both domestically and abroad.

Alex MacDonald has previously held positions in the United Nations, Government of Alberta, on Parliament Hill in Ottawa and in industry. He now works for Counsel Public Affairs.

Dr. Jeremy Whitlock is a private consultant with experience at the International Atomic Energy Agency and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories.