Taking Nuclear to the Seas

 

by Dr. Jeremy Whitlock

August 2026


 
Nuclear 2.0 is upon us: a brave new world for the peaceful atom that reaches well beyond traditional borders and processes.

Microreactors will open the Arctic to defence, mining, and expanded habitation. Reactors large and small will lift energy-starved regions out of poverty, transition existing grids to cleaner configurations, take humanity to the moon and elsewhere, create vast inventories of new isotopes for industry and medicine, and enable clean shipping and other uses on the seas.

This last piece was the subject of a US-hosted gathering this past week in Washington DC, where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officially launched its ATLAS project: "Atomic Technologies Licensed for Applications at Sea".

ATLAS will bring together folks from both the maritime ecosystem (international organizations, port authorities, classification societies, and insurers) and nuclear ecosystem (regulators, R&D, safety, security and safeguards experts) to generate guidance and a roadmap to deployment.

This is a natural fit for nuclear power: it can operate in remote locations without refuelling for years if needed, without emitting greenhouse gases (GHG) or other pollutants. Today over 50,000 merchant ships ply the world's waters at any given time, accounting for 3% of global GHG emissions – if this fleet were a country it would be in the top 10 of GHG polluters. By 2050 this fraction is expected to reach 10%, prompting the International Maritime Organization (IMO) some years ago to instead declare a goal of net zero emissions in that same timeframe.

Enter the atom.

Nuclear at sea is of course not a new concept, used extensively in several navies and Russian icebreakers since the 1950s. Civilian maritime nuclear has also seen limited prototyping since the 1960s, but today the popular resurgence of nuclear power as a clean and less geo-sensitive alternative to fossil fuels is prompting a fresh new look.

Along with the IMO and IAEA, other organizations in the shipping and nuclear domains (e.g., Lloyd's Register, World Nuclear Association) and research community have already published studies. In 2024 the Nuclear Energy Maritime Organization (NEMO) was founded in London to facilitate industry networking, including engagement with governance and regulatory organizations.

More recently the UK Maritime Nuclear Consortium was formed to bring together expertise from across the nuclear and maritime sectors (Lloyd's Register, Babcock, Rolls-Royce, Global Nuclear Security Partners (GNSP), Stephenson Harwood LLP, NorthStandard and Nuclear Risk Insurers), with GNSP leading the security and safeguards work. The Consortium is now putting the final touches to a comprehensive report to UK government and regulatory bodies that will identify the steps needed for safe, secure deployment of a maritime nuclear vessel flagged to that country.

The considerable work to date by all of these organizations will inform and accelerate the new ATLAS project, as confirmed at the project launch in Washington. Through ATLAS the IAEA will leverage its vast convening authority to draw global expertise towards a unified understanding of the gaps in existing infrastructure, policies and legal frameworks: gaps that will need to be addressed to ensure seamless interoperability in ports around the planet.

Simply put, investors in nuclear maritime technology will need to see much less uncertainty on all these fronts before it can become a viable trade enabler. Crucially, they and the public will also need assurance that it can be done safely, securely, and with the unique nuclear wrinkle of non-proliferation obligations fully addressed.

A key challenge for ATLAS is the mobility and general inaccessibility of maritime reactors – factors notably absent from the civilian nuclear world over the past 80 years. In particular, many security, safeguards and jurisdictional implications arise in a dynamic interplay between flag State, coastal State and port State responsibilities, and continue into international waters.

Compounding this are the long core life between refuelling (up to 10 or 20 years) and the generally advanced nature of many nuclear technologies now in development – two challenges not unique to maritime deployment, but further complicating the tasks of effective and efficient security and safeguards oversight.

And yes there is the public. A jaded view of the past 80 years would conclude that adequate demonstration of safety, security, and non-proliferation – while necessary – is not enough. If the technology cannot be embraced by the public then nuclear-powered ships – however proven technically – will simply not be welcomed into ports. This has always been the wild card of nuclear progress, and maritime deployment will add new levels of risk to the debate.

For the nuclear and shipping experts gathering this past week in Washington all of this seemed quite clear, and "management of expectations" was the name of the game. In time ATLAS will shepherd those expectations toward global consensus as only the IAEA can, and it will be up to the private developers, oversight institutions, and governments of the world to convince a sceptical public that the considerable benefits to humanity outweigh the risks.

Sail on, ATLAS!

 

Discussion welcome.

©2026 Jeremy Whitlock


About the Author

Dr. Jeremy Whitlock is a private consultant (Founder and Principal, Ottertail Consulting Inc.), and a Senior Associate Consultant with GNSP, with 30 years experience in nuclear non-proliferation, reactor physics, and stakeholder engagement. He lives in Stratford, Ontario, and feels that canoes are the closest humans have come to inventing a perfect machine.


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